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1 "…the only way in which the public learns anything at all about what is happening abroad is through the media." 1 Throughout history, the media has played a critical role in a nation's ability or inability to conduct armed conflict. The reporting cycle and the delivery of the information has undergone a dramatic transformation with the age of satellites and mini-uplink stations, yet the basic tenets of war reporting and its relationship with both the military and the national government are largely unchanged. The military and the government strongly desire to achieve the national objective while the media sees its role to both accurately report the conflict and tell the story such that it sparks reader interest. This paper will briefly examine the last 150 years of war and the military-media
relationship to see what impact that relationship has had on the nation's ability to wage war. The examination will expose some of the key successes, failures, and consistencies throughout history concluding with a close look at the most recent war, Operation Iraqi Freedom and the advent of the "embedded reporter." The Operational
Commander is wise to review media relations and the successes and pitfalls of past conflicts, and to examine closely the results of Operation Iraqi Freedom so as to completely understand the media before developing a plan for media relations in a future operation.
There are two general categories of wars, those where national survival is at stake and those where national survival is not perceived to be at stake. As will be shown, where national survival is at stake, the media and the military are mutually supportive and are almost completely in step to ensure the military members and the civilians maintain their morale. In general, wars prior 1950 can be categorized as wars of national survival. With the creation of the United Nations and the advent of the cold war, each succeeding war from the United States perspective, has not been a war for national survival. Thus the media has been less likely to completely and unhesitatingly support the government's national objective; this has often led to a more tenuous relationship between the media and the military. While many of the conflicts discussed have similarities in the media-military relationship, only a few specific points will be highlighted in each conflict. Collectively the issues will paint the mosaic showing the experiences which shape the current media-military relationship.
The Crimean War (1854-1856) was a conflict which pitted the Tsar of Russia against Turkey, France, and England. Embroidered within the fabric of this war are threads of media actions that would become common in future wars. Oversimplification of complex issues, dramatic if not completely truthful phrasing, and a genuine desire to look after the troops were characteristics of the British media in this conflict. Editorials in The Times of London recommended war, and likely influenced Britain's decision to declare war. The Times editorial following the declaration of war clearly indicated national survival was at stake:
No alternative is left to us; the decision has been taken out of our hands; and, unless we would submit, with our allies, to crouch under the insolent dictatorship of a barbaric Power, and see the liberties of Europe disappear under the tramp of a Cossack, we have no other course. 2 The national fervor, while a great morale booster for the troops leaving Britain, was of little help to the soldier when the realities of war and the poor to non-existent supply infrastructure began to take their toll. The Times war correspondent, William Russell, had a significant impact through his war reports by exposing the lack of supplies, medical care, food, and other basic needs for the army. Of the 18,058 casualties, only 1,761 were combat related while the rest can be attributed to poor living and medical conditions including 13,150 who died in the first nine months! Russell's letters catalyzed the home front forcing the government to move quickly to vastly improve the camp conditions. As a result, the mortality rate of the soldiers in Crimea in the subsequent two years of the war was lower than that in London. 3 The American Civil War sheds light on issues relevant today: the insatiable demands of editors for stories, and with the telegraph, the advantages and limitations of a new technology. The rapid expansion of the United States before 1860 resulted in major cities dotting the country, each with up to five newspapers and most sending correspondents to the war -over 500 in total.
As editors saw it [under stress to expand circulation], it was vital to have as many "stories" as possible, the more dramatic the better. If there was difficulty in finding them, they must be fabricated, even if it meant elevating rumour or gossip into truth. Wilbur Storey of the Chicago Times sent an order to one of his men: 'Telegraph fully all news you can get and when there is no news send rumour.' 4, 5 As articles could only be transmitted one at a time with a normal transmit time of [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] minutes; the telegraph forced a reporter to get his story quickly on the wire in order to "scoop" the other newspapers in his city. The deadlines and the telegraph also combined to give the correspondent a geographic constraint. The correspondents were not necessarily where the news was, but "the news" was often where the reporters were, within daily reach of the telegraph office. 6 The demands for continuous reports left little time for the correspondents to find a story, flesh it out and report it accurately.
World War I and World War II are often pointed to as the pinnacles of the military-media relationship because the military and the media worked together seamlessly, with heavy censorship, to provide positive information about the war effort.
In The cold, raw number of casualties was never mentioned in the article for fear of its impact on British morale. In January 1942, the threat of Japanese invasion of Hawaii or the West Coast in conjunction with the German U-boat sinkings in the Atlantic galvanized America to a single-minded focus on defeat of the enemy. Unlike previous wars, most media on the front lines were recruited by the military and "embedded" throughout the front line units. The correspondents understood they worked for the army and the articles they produced were thoroughly censored before being used in magazines such as Stars and Stripes. As a model for war where national survival is at stake, the media-military relationship in both World Wars would be useful. However, the severe censorship employed in such wars would not be tolerated in lesser conflicts.
The Korean conflict highlights the problem of changing the rules of censorship during a war. Early on, correspondents had free access throughout the battle space and, though articles leaving Korea were routinely sent using military communications systems, the correspondents experienced little censorship in reporting. When the Chinese entered the war and drove the allied coalition back down the Korean peninsula, the resultant negative reporting sparked General MacArthur to imposed strict censorship. The purpose of the shift was to soften the reports back home of coalition
losses. Yet to the media, it was an attempt to cover up failure.
Most Vietnam veterans would suggest that the Vietnam War was lost because the media turned against the troops and the government. A careful examination of some of the key issues -lack of clearly identifiable military objectives, television's impact on public opinion, and inaccurate government reporting -demonstrate that the media, military, and government all share responsibility for the loss.
First, the US objective and intermediate goals in Vietnam were not clearly articulated to the media or even to the combatants and thus, it was impossible for the media to assess for themselves whether we were "winning." Without a front line, correspondents could not move up to the front and assess the situation by observation or interview. Therefore, the only news they received was from official briefings, rumors and occasional trips out with the troops via helicopter or patrol. Similar to the Civil War, the correspondents in Vietnam felt pressure to produce "news worthy" stories to justify expenses which often led to dramatization and generalization of a specific situation. A CBS story provides a good example:
The day's operation … wounded three women, killed one baby, wounded one marine, and netted these four prisoners. Four old men who could not answer questions put to them in English. Four old men who had no idea what an ID card was. Today's operation is the frustration of Vietnam in miniature. There is little doubt that American fire power can win a military victory. But to a Vietnamese peasant whose home means a lifetime of back-breaking labour it will take more than presidential promises to convince him that we are on his side. 8 This dramatic story clearly leads the reader to believe such events were typical, even though the truth was that the average reporter produced stories from quick trips outside Siagon and would have been unable to accurately generalize the war effort from this specific scene. The story was where the reporter was rather than where the news actually was. 9 As the war progresses, the official government releases and the media reporting Viewers, sitting at home, instinctively believed that, if a general appeared, he was almost certainly covering up; a colonel was probably protecting his regiment; a young officer was probably saying what he had been told to say; but, when a lance corporal appeared, of course he was telling the truth -after all, he's just an ordinary bloke like one of us!" 10 With this in mind the British altered their media guidelines for their troops. The change allowing them to answer media questions rather than be evasive proved very successful in maintaining the morale of the soldiers and support at home.
The Falklands War was the most recent war prior to OIF where correspondents were embedded with the military. There are two important lessons to learn from the Falklands experience. First, since embedded correspondents followed the troops continuously, they could capture the mood of the troops and find a way to make the experience relatable to the viewers at home. With several ships on the bottom of the ocean and the British advance bogged down, an embedded photographer took a picture of a soldier accepting a cup of tea from a Falkland Island family which shortly landed on the front page. As one correspondent astutely noted:
The photograph was a quintessential image of Britishness. The custom of tea drinking was projected as a hallmark of English culture, while the symbolic picket fence signaled ownership and domestication of this farflung corner of empire, legitimizing the campaign to re-establish sovereignty over it.
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The picture provided comfort to a nation troubled about the course of action being taken.
The second lesson concerned censorship. The censorship was draconian and enforceable since the Falklands were so remote that the only way correspondents could Saddam's second action was to use the international media in Baghdad to quickly broadcast destruction and death when a coalition bomb or missile errantly hit a civilian complex, in order to "arouse the sympathy of the world to the damage inflicted in his country by a superpower." 12 For example, after a bomb hit a civilian air raid shelter, the Jordanian Times reported the attack as "a living testimony to the US-led alliance's cruelty, cynicism and total disregard for human life in conducting this ugly and pointless war against Iraq." 13 Though Saddam's tactics were unsuccessful, the military was forced to spend significant time explaining the occasional failure of precision weapons.
A press pool concept was instituted during Desert Storm which severely limited media access, embittering those without access and forcing them to report the war as independent correspondents or as they were more commonly called; "unilaterals."
Without access, under pressure to produce stories, and in competition with those who had access, the unilaterals were more likely to dramatize the news information which often provided the public with a skewed perspective of 'real events'. More importantly, unilaterals were not bound by the censoring guidelines which forbid pool correspondents from reporting on future operations. As General Schwarzkopf moved his forces into position for the attack, the unilaterals reported the relative positions of coalition troops. While the Iraqi forces did not use these reports to prepare for an enveloping attack, the unilateral reports provided the Iraqis an opportunity to improve their defenses. Despite this, General Schwarzkopf did achieve tactical surprise. As the battle was coming to a close, long lines of Iraqi troops were retreating from Kuwait. Coalition air power decimated the columns and the slaughter was shown live on CNN. As the troops had not surrendered, they were valid military targets whose destruction would limit Saddam's future combat power. However, the outcry to halt the attacks was so significant that remaining Iraqi forces were allowed to return to Iraq uncontested. This was the first situation where destruction of enemy troops became a cause for public concern.
The Balkans conflict showed an almost identical exploitation of civilian casualties as was demonstrated in Desert Storm. The Balkans civil war had produced such horrific pictures that NATO was compelled to intervene to act as a humanitarian force to stabilize the region. Unsuccessful as a passive police force, NATO resorted to offensive force to establish the conditions for stability and while most of the air strikes were accurate, occasionally a bomb would cause civilian casualties. The Serbian Leader, Slobodan Milosevic was quick to highlight these tragedies to the media and as a result, NATO spent significant time repairing its credibility as a professional military force when only a very small fraction of the bombs missed the targets. Milosevic used the media as a weapon -NATO needed public support to continue aerial attacks as part of the stabilization process and Milosevic was nearly able to eliminate that support. 16 In the span of just over 150 years, media coverage of wars increased from fewer than ten correspondents in the Crimean War to over 7,000 on the ground in Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Anticipating this onslaught of correspondents, the Operation Iraqi
Freedom planners developed the most comprehensive media plan ever conceived for a major combat operation. The plan included daily briefings, an embedded media program, and a plan to handle the expected onslaught of unilateral correspondents.
Briefings were held both in the Pentagon and in the operational theater. The general media opinion was that the daily briefings were long on spin and short on substance. The reality, at least from one reporter's opinion was somewhat different.
Most correspondents assigned to cover the Doha briefings anticipated that General
Franks would pick up exactly where General Schwarzkopf left off 11 years before and they were excited. Instead, they quickly saw that Brigadier General Brooks would lead the briefings. Media Critic Michael Wolff continues:
… we [the correspondents] would be as close to the guy running this theater as the reporters in the first Gulf War were close to Schwarzkopf, who was a star. He was great. He made great television. I'm sure he gave no more information than we got this time around, but the difference now -and it's an important difference -is that even when you're not getting information from the guy who has the information to give, you're still getting information by the very fact that he's not giving it to you. Brooks was obviously just a messenger; he was just saying what he was told to say, so there was no way you could measure the quality of that. He was not making the decision not to tell us something. There was no reading him and he was basically expressionless for a reason: he knew nothing. If there was a war with Iraq, journalists would be with the troops. In Afghanistan, he said, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda showed great skill in news management. The best way to combat that was to have accurate, professional journalists on the ground to see the truth of what was going on. He said he had already had intelligence from Iraq that they were arranging things to mislead the press. Having people who are honest and professional see these things and be aware of that is useful. So I consider it not just the right thing to do but also a helpful thing. Amid the good news stories, an occasional error was made and civilian lives were often lost, yet because the embedded reporter was there to see the event in context with the environment, the report, though sobering and unfortunate, was accepted by the American public as an error by soldiers trying to do their job in a difficult situation.
The following example illustrates this point:
On the same day the ammo dump blew, I was involved in probably the worst nightmare for the Department of Defense concerning the embed process because I was right there when this civilian tragedy happened. The incident started when a civilian vehicle tried to come through the checkpoint and ignored the warning shots. [Several vehicles followed which also ignored the warning shots -however, the final two vehicles were an agricultural truck and a minibus filled with civilians.] The Marines opened fire on all the vehicles as they came through the checkpoint. They killed three children and two women on the bus. Because I had such an open relationship with the unit, they knew I was going to have to make this report. We were all in shock as we set up the videophone. It was a horrible scene but I couldn't hold back. I couldn't pull any punches. I had to say exactly what I saw and how bad it was. As it turned out, I think the full disclosure worked to the benefit of everyone. There was no need for other reporters to find out what really happened because I was there as an eyewitness. While I was giving the live report, the executive officer of the company and two of the platoon sergeants were standing on the other side of the camera watching me. After I finished the report, the executive officer walked up to me and said, "You were fair." 20 A second example, the unfortunate drowning death of two Marines along the Saddam Hussein Canal, demonstrates how the presence of the embedded media created additional stress on a unit commander and yet his presence averted a potential cover-up.
Washington Times Chief Photographer Joe Eddins took pictures of a search for bodies
being conducted by his unit but was asked to leave the area before he could learn the details. Upon returning to camp, he contacted associates working in the Pentagon to discuss the situation. Quickly, very senior commanders were questioned about the deaths and subsequently initiated a top-down inquiry as to the circumstances surrounding the deaths. The on-scene commander, a junior field grade officer, under stress of the event, initially attempted to limit exposure of the tragedy by pushing the media back -leaving the impression with the media that he was trying to cover up the situation. The correspondent actually eliminated a potential cover-up situation by forcing rapid communications between commanders to adequately explain the event. John Roberts highlighted this point by reporting that the troops he was with wanted their families to see them on TV. Even the skeptics were won over after the first delivery of mail confirmed that every family was watching. 22 The affect on the military families was even more pronounced and the correspondents often became conduits for the families and soldiers to communicate. GLOBE TV Executive Producer and ABC News and Nightline Correspondent Mike Cerre reported that he became the only reliable conduit through which families could communicate with their soldiers and consequently, whenever he was able to connect with a satellite, he would download a huge chain email and parcel it out to the troops and in return, he would allow the troops to build a reply using his laptop. 23 The military got one unexpected tactical advantage -better situational awareness of battlefield conditions; and one unspoken strategic advantage -informing future potential adversaries that the United States was a force to be reckoned with. An example of the tactical advantage was Marine Lieutenant General Conway's control and redirection of his forces after he observed a live embedded report from his front line units. 24 The second strategic advantage is more difficult to directly link to a concrete example; however, it is reasonable to link Omar Kadafi's decision to request United Nations inspector assistance in dismantling his nuclear weapons program on 19
December 2003 to the highly publicized capture of a disheveled looking Saddam
Hussein from a "spider hole" in northern Iraqi, five days earlier. held. The unit commander allowed the presence of the media to become a factor in his decision to seize the initiative, expand his orders, and remain in the city to achieve a strategic aim that was beyond the scope of his responsibility. 25 Access, the lifeblood of the media, was almost unlimited within each embedded reporter's unit and the censorship guidelines from which he worked were straight however, most were pleased with the wealth of information available from which to write.
Media personnel viewing the war from a distance expressed grave concern that the embeds had become biased and limited by censorship as indicated from this quote from an article in the Dissident Voice:
Jim Axelrod, embedded with the Third Infantry, discussed an intelligence briefing he sat in on and said, "We've been given orders." Realizing the implications of what he said, he revised himself: "Soldiers have been given orders." On that same day, Tom Brokaw began reporting on "how successful we were" in a battle before correcting himself: "how successful the United States was." People talk about embedding's limitations and how they felt restricted or too close to the unit, and I found the arguments ridiculous. The bottom line is if the military's going to be open enough to say, "Look, you can come with us. We will let you see everything you want to see and cover the war from this close-up seat," of course, it's not a perfect environment; of course, you can say, "Well, gee, you know, we would like to do this; we would like to do that we would like to have more access; we would like to be able to talk to the enemy soldiers." Well, you know what? That's fine, but that's unrealistic. 28 Mr. Koopman goes on to address censorship (a form of forced biased) with the following:
… my case, there was not a bit of censorship. I remember one day, it wasn't until we were in Baghdad and we had a little time on our hands and I was sitting there talking to McCoy [the battalion commander] one night and he said, "You know, I never have read any of your stories. 29 The censor rules stated that the reporter could not talk about troop locations, strength, and future operations. In effect, the censorship was self imposed because if the reporter violated those rules, he was potentially putting himself in physical danger on the battlefield. Only a handful of the over 700 embeds were disembedded for violating the rules and none of the violations appeared to lead to the death of a coalition soldier.
In the first days of the war, news from the embedded media dominated all news channels. The sheer volume of reports from the 700 embeds overwhelmed the public and the state-side media's ability to create a concise image of the war. After the first several days of the conflict, viewers migrated from the 24 hour news channels to more consolidated mediums such as news papers and the evening news broadcasts. The challenge the consolidators faced was assimilating all the somewhat inconsistent data into a simple story line. The rapid movement of the Army and Marine Corps units towards Baghdad, and the media's lack of knowledge of military terms, fed the inconsistent reporting. For example, the port of Umm Qasr was declared "won" by the media 11 different times. The cause of the confusion was reporting by various embeds who each had a different definition of "won." 30 In general, the media got better at assimilating the daily 700 soda-straws of information as the war progressed.
The military was inconsistent in a few cases with the application of the embedded media guidelines. Most notably, Al Jazeera Correspondent Amr El-Kakhy was embedded with the Fifteenth Marine Expeditionary Unit. Mr. El-Kakhy reported numerous circumstances in which his requests were ignored and where he was excluded from briefings where other media embeds were in attendance. When asked why he was excluded from briefings, the answer was: "You know, guys, you are a station with a reputation." 31 Ultimately, Mr. El-Kakhy decided to disembed out of frustration with regard to his access.
Unilateral correspondents were a distinct challenge for the military because they were uncontrolled, uncensored, and not located on the battlefield. Fortunately, the embedded media was a great counter to most reports a unilateral correspondent might produce. In almost every circumstance, an embedded reporter was on the scene with a unilateral correspondent and if the two separate reports were dramatically different, reporting credibility of the unilateral was marginalized. Of the 18 media personnel killed from March to September 2003, the majority were unilateral correspondents.
They were killed by both coalition and Iraqi forces. The challenge, at least for coalition forces, was identifying the correspondent. Unilateral correspondents frequently wore clothing and drove cars similar to the Iraqi people and Fedayeen. Even more, unilateral correspondents had to get to the front lines and move around on the battle field to be effective, and in trying to keep up with the fast paced advance, they occasionally found themselves in an unenviable position between the two military forces.
The media liked the unilateral option as a complement to the embedded correspondent because a unilateral correspondent had more autonomy in finding and researching individual stories and generally, the unilateral correspondent was able to
give a better view and analysis of the overall war. The challenge for the unilateral correspondent was to get a story equally or more dramatic than the embedded reporter was providing.
Conclusions:
Throughout history the relationship between the military and the media has been a strained, symbiotic association marked by significant success and substantial failure.
Advances in technology -be it the telegraph, radio, television, or satellite at home and the war in Afghanistan was directly linked to the terrorist attack only two months before. There were a few media voices of dissent but they were largely ignored and the war was conducted in a mutually supportive environment.
The wars since World War II -Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Desert Storm, the Balkans, and Operation Iraqi Freedom -have all been wars of national policy. In these conflicts, public support had to be earned and then sustained, both in the objectives of the campaign and in the manner in which it was conducted; they had to be seen as just and proportional. 32 With the notable exception of Grenada, the government has been able to successfully convince the majority of the American people of the necessity for each conflict. Maintenance of that support can be problematic and is often inversely proportional to American casualties. Additionally, the ability of our military to clearly articulate the purpose, goals, and progress in the conflict and the demonstrated professionalism of our soldiers play an important role in public opinion. The conduct of our forces is absolutely critical and must stand up to a moral standard for compassion and deference towards civilians, and adherence to the law of warfare, that is much higher than that expected of the enemy.
The successful operational commander must understand the tendencies of the media and the pitfalls of the military. The media brings to the battlefield two traits which are enduring. First is a flair for dramatic story-telling with a desire to generalize from a specific action. The second is the effect deadlines and news volume requirements have in placing pressure on correspondents to produce news worthy stories. Ultimately, the bottom line for the media is just that -readership/viewership.
The military strongly desires a media which will be understanding of operational ii. The rules for disclosure of information to the embedded media must be, as Operation Iraqi Freedom was, predisposed to provide the requested information rather than to keep it classified.
iii. The embed program should be maintained as long as possible after major conflict operations are over. The stability phase of an operation often is more demanding of an impartial eye-witness.
2. The operational commander must provide detailed training to the officers and senior enlisted concerning the operation and operating with the media.
a. The soldiers must understand and should be able to articulate the reason they have been employed and the general plan for attaining the overall goal.
b. Full and timely disclosure to the embedded media must be fully understood and practiced by all levels of command.
c. Soldiers at all levels must be trained with respect to the military-media relationship. Officers should have extensive media training.
d. All soldiers and commanders must understand the unique challenges the unilateral correspondents bring to enemy identification on the battlefield.
3. The commander and subordinate commanders must understand the dynamic which embedded media brings, and its effect on command and control.
a. The commander must not make decisions based on how it will look in the media, but rather must continue to make decisions based on what is best and necessary to complete the operational assignment.
b. Subordinate commanders must not make independent decisions to change operational parameters or tasking so as to achieve a specific media effect without previously consulting with senior commanders.
c. The commanders must not hesitate to use live media broadcasts as a source of real-time intelligence to improve the decision making process.
d. The commander must recognize that some embedded reports highlighting minor problems will occasionally turn into crises at home.
While largely unavoidable, these issues must be fully and quickly investigated to reduce the snowball effect and its impact on the American public.
e. The commander must make sure that all levels of the chain of command understand that, while events will unfold and likely be seen by the American public either at the same time or prior to the chain of command, this should not be a cause for additional oversight of the subordinate engaged in combat.
f. When bad news does occur, the on-site commander must make a report up the chain of command and allow the media to make similar full reports within the limits of the normal embedded guidelines. The adage that 'bad news never gets better with age" is even more true now with the advent of satellite phones and television.
4. And finally, treat the media like an inspection team. Work in such a manner that you have nothing to hide and they will have nothing to find. The United States
Military is the most professional, most highly trained fighting force in the world.
We want our story to be told.
